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SLICING THROUGH THE GREAT LEGAL 
GORDIAN KNOT:  WAYS TO ASSIST PRO SE 
LITIGANTS IN THEIR QUEST FOR JUSTICE 
Shon R. Hopwood*
 
 
In Greek mythology, the Gordian Knot was a large intertwined rope that 
was impossible to untie.  The knot was the work of Gordius, a king in what 
is now Turkey.  Legend has it that King Gordius fastened his chariot to a 
pole using the Gordian Knot.  Then Alexander the Great arrived and 
attempted to unravel it.  Anyone who has ever tried to unpack the box of 
last year’s Christmas lights can appreciate what Alexander was up against.  
He tried, unsuccessfully, and became frustrated at his inability to undo what 
could not be undone.  So he finally opened the Gordian Knot by cutting 
through it with his sword.  Alexander’s solution to the problem led to the 
idiom “cutting the Gordian Knot,” which simply means solving a 
complicated problem through bold action.1
The problems facing pro se litigants are as daunting as the famed 
Gordian Knot.  Imagine trying to unravel the law without knowing where 
the ends of the knot begin.  Or for that matter, imagine trying to plead your 
case without the benefit of a legal education.  This was the quandary that 
confronted me. 
 
From 1998 to 2008, I was incarcerated in a federal prison—the result of 
five bank robberies I committed as a foolish young adult.  While in prison, I 
was fortunate to receive a job in the prison law library.  There, I sat reading 
novels until June of 2000, when the Supreme Court handed down Apprendi 
v. New Jersey,2
 
*  J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law (Gates Scholar), 2014.  In 1998, 
Mr. Hopwood was sentenced to serve twelve years and three months in federal prison for his 
role in five armed bank robberies.  While in prison, he studied law and began preparing 
briefs for other prisoners.  He prepared two petitions for writs of certiorari that were granted 
by the U.S. Supreme Court, and a host of successful direct appeals, post-conviction motions, 
and habeas corpus petitions.  In 2008, Hopwood was released from prison and became a 
consultant for Cockle Law Brief Printing Company, where he advised numerous attorneys 
on Supreme Court practice.  He also created The CockleBur (http://www.thecocklebur.com), 
a legal blog. In 2012, Crown/Random House will publish his memoir, entitled Law Man:  
My Story of Robbing Banks, Winning Supreme Court Cases, and Finding Redemption. 
 a case calling into question the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
(Guidelines).  Although at the time I could not have named a right in the 
Bill of Rights, I began the process of learning the law through self-study so 
that I could challenge my sentence.  It ended badly.  I filed a post-
 1. See generally ARRIAN, THE CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER 104–06 (Aubrey De 
Sélincourt trans., Penguin Books rev. & enlarged ed. 1971). 
 2. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
1230 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
conviction motion with the Eighth Circuit only to learn that I had filed the 
motion with the wrong court.  Once it was in the hands of the right court, it 
was unceremoniously denied. 
But the result did not discourage me, and I went on to write post-
conviction motions and appeals briefs for other prisoners over an eight-year 
span.  While I did have some success, this is definitely not the norm. 
I witnessed firsthand the difficulties that pro se litigants face both while I 
was in prison and later at Cockle Law Brief Printing Company—one of the 
largest U.S. Supreme Court brief printers in the country and the only printer 
I am aware of that assists pro se litigants filing petitions for certiorari.  Brief 
printing is kind of a misnomer at Cockle, because that is the easy part.  At 
Cockle, my primary job is to consult with attorneys and pro se parties on 
everything from filing requirements to how to phrase the Question 
Presented in a manner to attract the Court’s interest.  Before the briefs are 
ready to print, we often consult and sometimes plead with parties to make 
stylistic and substantive changes to their briefs. 
Dealing with pro se litigants is not easy.  When a brief comes into 
Cockle, the office manager sets the documents on a counter where one of 
the staff will snatch it up to start the process.  When a pro se brief is placed 
on the counter, more often than not, it lingers longer than an attorney-
prepared brief.  To be sure, someone will eventually take it, but nobody 
really wants to; they are twice, often four times, more work than a normal 
brief. 
I bet avoiding pro se briefs is a common occurrence among clerks in 
courts across the country.  I recently read a legal blog post discussing a 
particularly poor circuit brief written by an attorney.  In the comment area, 
someone said that while the brief was awful, it was better than the ones he 
had read in his three years as a pro se clerk.  The next comment was telling 
on the state of pro se litigation.  The comment said:  “They should award 
purple hearts for suffering through that.”3
The increase in pro se litigation during these difficult economic times is 
well documented,
 
4 as are the problems facing pro se litigants.5
 
 3. Cornellian, Comment to Lousy Legal Writing, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 7, 2011, 
12:01 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/01/07/lousy-legal-writing/. 
  People 
 4. See ABA COALITION FOR JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE SURVEY OF JUDGES ON THE IMPACT 
OF THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN ON REPRESENTATION IN THE COURTS (PRELIMINARY) 3, 5 
(2010), available at http://www.abajournal.com/files/Coalition_for_Justice_Report_
on_Survey.pdf (survey of approximately 1,200 state trial judges noted that 60 percent of 
judges saw an increase in the number of unrepresented parties in 2009); ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES tbl.2.4 (2009), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/statistics/judicialfactsandfigures/2008/alljudicialfactsfigur
es.pdf. 
 5. See generally Deborah J. Cantrell, Justice for Interests of the Poor:  The Problem of 
Navigating the System Without Counsel, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1573 (2002); Thomas C. 
O’Bryant, The Great Unobtainable Writ:  Indigent Pro Se Litigation After the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299 (2006); Nina 
Ingwer VanWormer, Help at Your Fingertips:  A Twenty-First Century Response to the Pro 
Se Phenomenon, 60 VAND. L. REV. 983 (2007); RICHARD MOORHEAD & MARK SEFTON, 
DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, LITIGANTS IN PERSON:  UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN 
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filing pro se must try to untie the tangled rope of procedure, rules, and 
precedent on their own.  The result is often a morass of indecipherable legal 
pleadings, forfeiture of basic rights, and clogging of court dockets.  Thomas 
O’Bryant, a prisoner serving a life sentence in Florida, described the 
obstacles confronting him as a pro se prisoner: 
I had to engage in two extremely difficult tasks:  I had to teach myself the 
law, and I had to represent myself.  I had to perform these tasks using 
only the limited resources available to me inside the prison walls and 
while trying to adjust to prison life, overcome mental health issues, such 
as severe depression, and fight a drug addiction.6
Rather than providing some overarching solution for the myriad 
problems faced by pro se litigants (because no one-size-fits-all solution 
exists and I am not that smart), I will discuss three specific difficulties I 
have witnessed and how these problems could be rectified.  The first 
problem involves federal prisoners filing post-conviction motions; the 
second involves pro se prisoners filing civil rights actions; and the third 
involves pro se civil litigants filing an appeal.  Although the impediments 
associated with pro se litigation are overwhelming, they can be reduced 
through targeted legislation, court action, and the assistance of the bar. 
 
In 1995, Timothy McVeigh committed a heinous act of terrorism.  While 
tragic, the government’s response—as is usually the case when it acts in the 
moment—was to pass legislation that was almost equally as tragic.  On 
April 24, 1996, President Clinton signed the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 19967 (AEDPA).  Among other things, the Act 
established a one-year limitation for federal defendants wishing to 
collaterally attack their conviction or sentence through a motion under 
28 U.S.C. § 2255.  That one-year period runs from when the judgment 
becomes final, which could be as quick as ten days after sentencing, or after 
the direct appeal is completed.8
In signing AEDPA, President Clinton hailed it as a way for the United 
States to remain “in the forefront of the international effort to fight 
terrorism through tougher laws and resolute enforcement.”
 
9
 
FIRST INSTANCE PROCEEDINGS 153–80 (2005), available at http://www.law.cf.ac.uk/
research/pubs/repository/1221.pdf (discussing various issues facing pro se litigants in 
English courts). 
  In describing 
the changes to prisoners’ ability to avail themselves of the writ of habeas 
corpus, the President stated:  “First, I have long sought to streamline 
Federal appeals for convicted criminals sentenced to the death penalty.  For 
 6. O’Bryant, supra note 5, at 300. 
 7. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 8. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1) (2006 & Supp. I 2007); see also Clay v. United States, 
537 U.S. 522 (2003). 
 9. Presidential Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996, 1 PUB. PAPERS 630, 631 (Apr. 24, 1996), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws/index.php?pid=52713. 
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too long, and in too many cases, endless death row appeals have stood in 
the way of justice being served.”10
While President Clinton may have thought the goal of the Act was to 
confront terrorism and reduce the amount of time death row inmates have to 
challenge their convictions and sentences, the actual statute had a far 
broader sweep than was needed to accomplish those goals.  As I noted, 
AEDPA bars all federal prisoners from filing post-conviction motions 
challenging their case unless those prisoners file the motion within one year 
of sentencing or direct appeal. 
 
To the casual observer, that seems like a reasonable procedure.  After all, 
federal defendants do receive an attorney for a direct appeal to an appellate 
court, so every conviction and sentence has the possibility of review.  Thus, 
why would prisoners need another appeal?  Even if they did, it seems 
reasonable to require them to file it within a reasonable amount of time. 
But those arguments assume that appellate review ferrets out every case 
where a legal error or a miscarriage of justice has occurred.11
For this reason, we have post-conviction motions that are used primarily 
to challenge attorney acts or omissions amounting to ineffective assistance 
of counsel.
  Worse yet, 
such an argument assumes that lawyers are infallible, because only claims 
raised at the trial court level and subsequently appealed are subject to 
review.  If the trial attorney commits a grave error, and she is the same 
counsel on appeal, how likely is it that she will find and raise her own error 
before the appellate court?  It is not. 
12  While I was in prison, post-conviction motions under § 2255 
were the principal way that prisoners would challenge everything from 
attorney sentencing error to counsel’s failure to file a timely notice of 
appeal.13
The writ of habeas corpus, under which § 2255 motions fall, is not some 
extravagant, ill-advised method for prisoners to receive another bite at the 
apple.  Rather, it is a sacred right secured in the body of the Constitution, a 
right that the “Framers viewed . . . as a fundamental precept of liberty” and 
a “vital instrument to secure . . . freedom.”
 
14  Although the Framers thought 
that habeas corpus was a necessary component to a free society, subsequent 
Congresses have not shared that sentiment.15
 
 10. Id. 
 
 11. See Brendan Lowe, Will Georgia Kill an Innocent Man?, TIME (July 13, 2007), 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1643384,00.html (discussing the appellate 
obstacles that AEDPA created for death row inmate Troy Davis).  Georgia executed Troy 
Davis on September 21, 2011. See Cameron McWhirter, Georgia Prisoner Is Put to Death, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240531119037036
04576584551697538170.html. 
 12. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 13. For an excellent description of the unfairness wrought by AEDPA on post-
conviction remedies, see Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and 
Restoring Fairness to Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339 
(2006). 
 14. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008). 
 15. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 
2635–36 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)). 
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AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations places significant hurdles in 
front of federal prisoners who are ill-equipped to meet the Act’s deadline.  
These hurdles were on full display in the case of Melvin Brown.16  Melvin 
was a gentle twenty-four year old from Chicago, whom I met at the Federal 
Correctional Institution in Pekin, Illinois.  Melvin had been charged with 
possession with intent to distribute six grams of cocaine base.17  The 
evidence against Melvin was overwhelming and based upon his attorney’s 
sound advice, he pled guilty.  His sentencing occurred in 2003, before the 
big Blakely and Booker cases threw federal sentencing into chaos by 
making the Guidelines ranges discretionary.18
Melvin came from poverty, and his criminal record reflected it.  He had 
been charged with petty theft and distributing small amounts of narcotics, 
including one conviction in Illinois for what the state information said was 
possession with intent to distribute 0.1 grams of crack.  Since Melvin had 
been convicted of a serious “controlled substance offense” and had two 
previous controlled substance offenses, he was subject to the Guidelines’ 
career offender provision.
 
19  That provision boosted his sentence from a 
Guidelines range of approximately five to seven years to a range of sixteen 
to eighteen years.  He was sentenced to fifteen years and eight months.20
Ten days later, Melvin’s conviction became final, because Melvin’s 
attorney believed there were no meritorious grounds for appeal.  Three 
months later, Melvin was still awaiting his final destination to a federal 
prison.  By the time Melvin arrived in Pekin, the AEDPA clock had clicked 
down to seven months.  Melvin, with his ninth grade education, was 
required to learn the law, find the legal errors in his case, draft a lucid 
§ 2255 motion, and have it prepared in seven months. 
 
This set of circumstances was not an anomaly:  every week a bus would 
arrive at Pekin with new uneducated prisoners.  Most had no attorney to 
prepare a post-conviction motion because whatever funds they and their 
family did possess had already been poured into trial and appeal.  These 
legal novices were expected to learn the law and learn how to write within a 
year; otherwise, they would forever forfeit the ability to challenge their 
conviction or sentence. 
Melvin knocked on my cell door about two-and-a-half weeks before his 
§ 2255 motion was due.  In his hands was a stack of disheveled papers.  He 
asked if I could take a look at his paperwork to see if he had an avenue to 
attack his sentence. 
I went through Melvin’s papers, which included documents from his 
prior state convictions, the ones used to increase his sentence under the 
career offender provision.  I found the Illinois conviction for which Melvin 
 
 16. See Brown v. United States, No. 2:04-cv-00073 (W.D. Mich. July 12, 2004), 
PACER No. 8. 
 17. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (2006). 
 18. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 
296 (2004). 
 19. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (2010). 
 20. See Brown, No. 2:04-cv-00073, at 1. 
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was originally charged with possession of 0.1 grams of crack with intent to 
distribute.  That charge had led to a plea to the reduced charge of simple 
possession, meaning it was not a distribution charge.21  This was a 
meaningful distinction under the Guidelines and meant that Melvin did not 
have the requisite number of prior convictions:  the career criminal 
provision did not apply.22
We filed the motion and the District Court Judge first ordered the 
probation officer, who prepared the Presentence Investigation Report, to 
respond.  The officer, to his credit, candidly admitted the mistake.  The 
Government agreed.  Melvin was sentenced to a little over five years. 
 
These types of stories are legion in federal prisons.  They illustrate that as 
long as fallible lawyers, probation officers, and judges exist, we need 
meaningful post-conviction avenues for federal prisons.  The current post-
conviction statute, as amended by AEDPA, restricts prisoners’ abilities to 
file a coherent motion, and therefore, the statute prevents federal prisoners 
from having a meaningful opportunity to challenge their convictions and 
sentences. 
So what is the solution to this problem?  Given our current financial 
outlook, I doubt Congress would spring for prisoner legal education.  The 
easiest solution would simply be for Congress to remove the one-year 
statute of limitations for non-capital federal offenders.  Why just non-
capital offenses?  For one, the political climate surrounding the death 
penalty is always icy and by keeping the one-year requirement for capital 
offenses, legislators would both avoid politicizing the amendment to 
AEDPA and serve the original purpose of the Act.  Moreover, while I have 
qualms about the federal death penalty, the one-year requirement for post-
conviction matters does not concern me; under current federal law, a federal 
capital defendant must be appointed two attorneys to represent her 
throughout post-conviction proceedings.23
Also, if the one-year statute of limitations were removed, prisoners 
would not feel compelled to file frivolous motions under time constraints.  
Many would prefer to wait and file when new decisions are handed down 
that may affect their case, but the one-year limit forces them to file before 
they are ready. 
  To put it differently, the statute 
of limitations provision does not require indigent, uneducated prisoners on 
death row to learn the law and present their claims pro se. 
The next item I would like to discuss is one of the most vexing problems 
facing prisoners:  a lack of health care.  Due to prison overcrowding and 
 
 21. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b). 
 22. See id. §§ 4B1.1(a), 4B1.2(c). 
 23. See 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) (2006) (“In any post conviction proceeding under section 
2254 or 2255 of title 28, United States Code, seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence, 
any defendant who is or becomes financially unable to obtain adequate representation or 
investigative, expert, or other reasonably necessary services shall be entitled to the 
appointment of one or more attorneys and the furnishing of such other services in accordance 
with subsections (b) through (f).”). 
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budget constraints, prisoners are often denied treatment altogether.24
I had a sixty-year-old friend named John Davis.  One day John was 
standing on a plastic chair so he could reach the pen lying on the top of his 
bunk bed.  The chair leg broke and John was sent plummeting to the floor.  
John fractured his wrist in two places.  After waiting several hours at the 
prison medical facility, John was taken to an orthopedic surgeon who reset 
the bones and placed John’s wrist in a half-cast.  John and the prison 
medical staff were instructed to re-examine and x-ray John’s wrist a week 
later.  Conducting a new x-ray within a week was vital, the surgeon said, 
because if the bones had aligned improperly the surgeon would need to re-
align John’s wrist before the bone fused together during the healing 
process. 
  Even 
when treatment is provided, it is sometimes delayed by weeks, months, or 
years.  This was a particular problem in the prison where I was housed. 
The next week, John waited for his name to be called for an appointment 
at the prison medical facility.  It never was.  John tried to discuss the 
problem with the prison medical administrator, who told him that he would 
be placed in segregation if he did not return to his housing unit.  The x-ray 
was never conducted and when John visited the surgeon a month later, the 
surgeon was furious because his order had been disobeyed.  The bones in 
John’s wrist had healed improperly, leaving John with significant lost 
functionality of his wrist. 
John sued the prison medical staff for deliberate indifference to his 
serious medical needs under the Eighth Amendment.  He survived a motion 
to dismiss and discovery began.  When he contacted the outside surgeon, he 
received no response.  Later, when the prison filed a motion for summary 
judgment, the surgeon—who had a long-running contract with the prison—
had changed his story, now claiming that the x-ray would have made no 
difference. 
I had my sister conduct research online, which indicated that the prison’s 
delay in x-raying John’s wrist could have contributed to the improper 
healing and loss of function.  But under circuit precedent, that was not 
enough.25
Since John made only twenty cents an hour at his prison job, he was 
unable to afford the witness, transcription, and subpoena fees required to 
perform a deposition.  We argued that the in forma pauperis (IFP) statute 
  John was required to show, through verifying medical evidence, 
that the delay in treatment caused harm.  We tried to contact medical 
experts but no one would respond, so we filed a motion to conduct a 
deposition with the surgeon who had treated John and a surgeon who did 
not possess a contract with the prison. 
 
 24. Joel H. Thompson, Today’s Deliberate Indifference:  Providing Attention Without 
Providing Treatment to Prisoners with Serious Medical Needs, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
635, 641–48 (2010). 
 25. See Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that an inmate 
alleging deliberate indifference delay in medical care “must place verifying medical evidence 
in the record to establish the detrimental effect of delay” or risk dismissal of his suit (quoting 
Beyerbach v. Sears, 49 F.3d 1324, 1326 (8th Cir. 1995))). 
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allowed the court to waive the deposition fees for indigent litigants who 
have no other way to obtain the verifying medical evidence required to 
succeed on a deliberate indifference claim.  That argument was rejected 
with little discussion by the District Court and the Seventh Circuit on 
appeal.26
In my experience, the difficulty indigent prisoners have in obtaining 
evidence to support their deliberate indifference claims is significant.  How 
can any prisoner expect to succeed in proving, through verifying medical 
evidence, that the delay in their treatment caused medical harm without 
access to doctors and medical specialists?  If prisoners have no ability to 
obtain the evidence necessary to prove their claims, it follows that they 
cannot remedy a violation of their constitutional rights.  In effect, the 
Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment is nothing 
more than dead words on paper—a pleasant ideal that is never enforceable. 
 
What is most unfortunate is that, in 1892, Congress provided indigent 
litigants with a way to obtain depositions sans fees.  In fact, the IFP statute 
specifically addresses this issue.  That statute states that “officers of the 
court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in such cases” 
and “[w]itnesses shall attend as in other cases.”27  Unfortunately, this 
language was read right out of the statute by federal courts of appeals in the 
1980s and early 90s,28 due to concerns that the statute would create a waste 
of resources by frivolous prisoner suits.  Those opinions conflict with a later 
Supreme Court decision,29 confuse the history of the IFP statute,30 and are 
based upon policy concerns that have largely been ameliorated with the 
passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995.31  For these reasons, I 
have argued that courts should reconsider how they construe the IFP 
statute.32
One small note:  even if my construction of the IFP statute does prevail, 
it would not result in a waste of resources for overburdened courts.  The 
Prison Litigation Reform Act allows district courts to dismiss frivolous 
suits before the discovery stage or at any other time if they feel that the 
claim is frivolous.  In addition, most indigent prisoner suits do not require 
 
 
 26. Davis v. Samalio, 286 F. App’x 325 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 27. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (2006). 
 28. A consensus of circuits holds that § 1915 does not authorize courts to waive indigent 
litigants’ witness fees in civil actions. See Pedraza v. Jones, 71 F.3d 194, 196–97 (5th Cir. 
1995); Malik v. Lavalley, 994 F.2d 90, 90 (2d Cir. 1993); Tedder v. Odel, 890 F.2d 210, 
211–12 (9th Cir. 1989); Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 474 (3d Cir. 1987); McNeil v. 
Lowney, 831 F.2d 1368, 1373 (7th Cir. 1987); Cookish v. Cunningham, 787 F.2d 1, 5 (1st 
Cir. 1986); U.S. Marshals Serv. v. Means, 741 F.2d 1053, 1057 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc); 
Johnson v. Hubbard, 698 F.2d 286, 289–90 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 29. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307–08 (1989) (holding that courts 
may request pro bono counsel to represent indigent litigants). 
 30. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 
 31. Pub. L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 
28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 32. See generally Shon R. Hopwood, A Sunny Deposition:  How the In Forma Pauperis 
Statute Provides an Avenue for Indigent Prisoners to Seek Depositions Without 
Accompanying Fees, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 195 (2011). 
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outside medical evidence in order to succeed.  The only result of the 
construction I propose is that indigent litigants with arguably meritorious 
claims would have the ability to conduct a deposition without fees in cases 
where there is no other means for obtaining the relevant evidence.  While 
this issue will undoubtedly be litigated by pro se prisoners at the trial level, 
that is not enough.  Members of the bar are needed to confront the courts of 
appeals in order for the issue to be taken seriously. 
The last item I will discuss is my experience working with pro se civil 
litigants on appeal.  The past few years have seen a huge increase in the 
amount of people filing civil appeals pro se.  In 2004, for example, non-
prisoner pro se litigants filed over 4,500 civil appeals in federal circuit 
courts, accounting for 14 percent of the civil appeal docket.33
The obstacles that pro se litigants face on appeal are similar to those 
found at the trial court level.  But on appeal, courts generally seem to 
enforce more stringent rules for pleadings and exhibit far less leniency than 
their trial court brethren.  This sometimes produces multiple deficiency 
letters and exasperation both from the party and the pro se clerk. 
 
I routinely work with these litigants at Cockle Printing.  Many of them 
contact us after they have received a deficiency letter from the Supreme 
Court Clerk’s Office.  Just talking with them takes the right amount of 
patience, tact, and at times, a delicate dose of forcefulness.  The majority of 
pro se people I encounter have sued big business or the government for 
discrimination and, right or wrong, they feel that injustices have been 
committed against them.  They also understand, especially after I kindly tell 
them, that their chances in the Supreme Court are next to nil.  It is usually 
then that they say, “I know, Shon, but I have got to take my chance 
anyway.”  To them, the Supreme Court is not only the place where the little 
guy gets his chance.  It is also, in the eyes of a pro se litigant, a place of 
closure. 
Solutions start with the courts.  While many appellate courts—including 
the Supreme Court—have added pro se resources for filing requirements to 
their websites,34
Online tools can play a profound role in assisting pro se litigants.  Cockle 
has a whole page dedicated to the services it can provide to pro se 
 few have added substantive tools necessary for pro se 
litigants to succeed when presenting their claims. 
 
 33. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS tbl.S-4 (2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/2004/tables/s4.pdf (citing statistics for the twelve-month period ending 
September 30, 2004); see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND 
FIGURES tbl.2.4 (2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialFactsAndFigures/2006/Table204.pdf (noting that, in 2004, all pro se appellants filed 
over 25,000 appeals, accounting for 42.7 percent of the federal circuit court docket). 
 34. See Guide for Prospective Indigent Petitioners for Writs of Certiorari, U.S. SUPREME 
COURT (2010), http://www.supremecourt.gov/casehand/guideforifpcases2010.pdf; 
Memorandum to Those Intending to Prepare a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in Booklet 
Format and Pay the $300 Docket Fee, U.S. SUPREME COURT (2010), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/casehand/guidetofilingpaidcases2010.pdf. 
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litigants,35 and more importantly, provides two different sample petitions 
that they can use as guides.36
Another way to assist pro se litigants in improving the quality of their 
briefs is through online education.  I believe that a series of online tutorials 
could save court clerks a vast amount of time, and therefore increase the 
efficiency of the courts.  In deciding what type of information should be 
provided in the tutorials, nothing should be taken for granted.  The very first 
tutorial should offer a summary of the appellate court’s role and explain 
what types of claims are reviewable.  For courts with discretionary review, 
a video explaining the chances of success would be the best advice any 
court could give to a would-be filer.  Most pro se petitioners at the Supreme 
Court level simply do not understand the odds against them and an 
explanation from the Court of the success rate and types of claims that are 
reviewed would deter some of these financially-strapped people—who have 
little chance at review—from filing in the first place.  Appellate courts 
should also place forms and fact sheets on their websites, like forms for 
simple motions such as extensions of time and fact sheets answering 
common questions on filing requirements and the appellate process. 
  Courts too would be wise to place sample 
motions and briefs on their website.  (One word of caution for courts 
thinking about adding sample briefs to their websites:  make sure the briefs 
you display meet all of the court’s filing requirements.  Pro se filers will 
follow those sample briefs sometimes to the letter and if the brief contains 
mistakes so will their filings.) 
The bar can also help pro se parties on appeal by providing “unbundled” 
services, which, in the case of appellate work, amounts to ghostwriting 
briefs.  While ghostwriting was once looked upon with disdain, in recent 
times it has recently been viewed as an opportunity for the bar to provide 
cost-effective legal guidance to those who cannot afford full 
representation.37  Indeed, even the American Bar Association has given its 
imprimatur to ghostwriting by recently loosening the ethical rules 
surrounding it.38
Through my company, I have worked with attorneys that regularly 
provide ghostwriting services to pro se parties on appeal.  In every one of 
the cases, the client could not afford the cost of full representation and it 
was for that reason that they had contacted the attorney about unbundled 
services.  All of the clients seemed to appreciate the low-cost services we 
 
 
 35. Pro Se Briefs, COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., http://www.cocklelaw.com/
briefs/pro-se-briefs/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
 36. Resources, COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., http://www.cocklelaw.com/resources/ 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
 37. See Margaret Martin Barry, Accessing Justice:  Are Pro Se Clinics a Reasonable 
Response to the Lack of Pro Bono Legal Services and Should Law School Clinics Conduct 
Them?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1879, 1926 (1999) (praising law school clinics that provide 
unbundled legal services and education to pro se litigants); Ira P. Robbins, Ghostwriting:  
Filling in the Gaps of Pro Se Prisoners’ Access to the Courts, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271 
(2010). 
 38. See ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-446, at 
1, 3–4 (2007). 
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provided and in return for a reduced fee, they received an attorney-prepared 
brief that they filed pro se—placing them in a much better position to 
succeed on their claims. 
From my experience, I can tell you that there is no rule of law, ethical 
guideline, or policy preference that can place pro se litigants on equal 
footing with those represented by counsel.  Yet there are ways for us to 
reduce the inherent inequities in our adversarial system for those unable to 
afford the cost.  Success for the pro se litigant is not unreachable.  They 
simply need some help.  It is up to every part of the legal system to provide 
that help so that justice may be acquirable for all. 
